From 4505f0154eaba59c432c869b65e2dc493837032a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?utf8?q?Beno=C3=AEt=20Ganne?= Date: Sat, 7 Dec 2019 09:14:27 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] ipsec: make sure pad_bytes does not exceed pad data size MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit This helps GCC understand the memcpy will not overflow pad_data. GCC-6 (default on Debian 9) in particular got confused. Type: fix Change-Id: I176eb01531b9d5c7ebec40f015e510b2d56e77c4 Signed-off-by: Benoît Ganne --- src/vnet/ipsec/esp_encrypt.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/vnet/ipsec/esp_encrypt.c b/src/vnet/ipsec/esp_encrypt.c index 186e122793d..6170603ded1 100644 --- a/src/vnet/ipsec/esp_encrypt.c +++ b/src/vnet/ipsec/esp_encrypt.c @@ -114,7 +114,11 @@ esp_add_footer_and_icv (vlib_buffer_t * b, u8 block_size, u8 icv_sz, } if (pad_bytes) - clib_memcpy_fast ((u8 *) f - pad_bytes, pad_data, pad_bytes); + { + ASSERT (pad_bytes <= ESP_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE); + pad_bytes = clib_min (ESP_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, pad_bytes); + clib_memcpy_fast ((u8 *) f - pad_bytes, pad_data, pad_bytes); + } f->pad_length = pad_bytes; b->current_length = new_length + icv_sz; -- 2.16.6