--- /dev/null
+/*
+ *------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates.
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at:
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ *------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include <vlib/vlib.h>
+#include <vnet/plugin/plugin.h>
+#include <vnet/crypto/crypto.h>
+#include <x86intrin.h>
+#include <crypto_ia32/crypto_ia32.h>
+#include <crypto_ia32/aesni.h>
+#include <crypto_ia32/ghash.h>
+
+#if __GNUC__ > 4 && !__clang__ && CLIB_DEBUG == 0
+#pragma GCC optimize ("O3")
+#endif
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ /* pre-calculated hash key values */
+ const __m128i Hi[8];
+ /* extracted AES key */
+ const __m128i Ke[15];
+} aes_gcm_key_data_t;
+
+static const __m128i last_byte_one = { 0, 1ULL << 56 };
+static const __m128i zero = { 0, 0 };
+
+static const u8x16 bswap_mask = {
+ 15, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0
+};
+
+static const u8x16 byte_mask_scale = {
+ 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
+};
+
+static_always_inline __m128i
+aesni_gcm_bswap (__m128i x)
+{
+ return _mm_shuffle_epi8 (x, (__m128i) bswap_mask);
+}
+
+static_always_inline __m128i
+aesni_gcm_byte_mask (__m128i x, u8 n_bytes)
+{
+ u8x16 mask = u8x16_is_greater (u8x16_splat (n_bytes), byte_mask_scale);
+
+ return _mm_blendv_epi8 (zero, x, (__m128i) mask);
+}
+
+static_always_inline __m128i
+aesni_gcm_load_partial (__m128i * p, int n_bytes)
+{
+#ifdef __AVX512F__
+ return _mm_mask_loadu_epi8 (zero, (1 << n_bytes) - 1, p);
+#else
+ return aesni_gcm_byte_mask (_mm_loadu_si128 (p), n_bytes);
+#endif
+}
+
+static_always_inline void
+aesni_gcm_store_partial (void *p, __m128i r, int n_bytes)
+{
+#ifdef x__AVX512F__
+ _mm_mask_storeu_epi8 (p, (1 << n_bytes) - 1, r);
+#else
+ u8x16 mask = u8x16_is_greater (u8x16_splat (n_bytes), byte_mask_scale);
+ _mm_maskmoveu_si128 (r, (__m128i) mask, p);
+#endif
+}
+
+static_always_inline void
+aesni_gcm_load (__m128i * d, __m128i * inv, int n, int n_bytes)
+{
+ for (int i = 0; i < n - 1; i++)
+ d[i] = _mm_loadu_si128 (inv + i);
+ d[n - 1] = n_bytes ? aesni_gcm_load_partial (inv + n - 1, n_bytes) :
+ _mm_loadu_si128 (inv + n - 1);
+}
+
+static_always_inline void
+aesni_gcm_store (__m128i * d, __m128i * outv, int n, int n_bytes)
+{
+ for (int i = 0; i < n - 1; i++)
+ _mm_storeu_si128 (outv + i, d[i]);
+ if (n_bytes & 0xf)
+ aesni_gcm_store_partial (outv + n - 1, d[n - 1], n_bytes);
+ else
+ _mm_storeu_si128 (outv + n - 1, d[n - 1]);
+}
+
+static_always_inline void
+aesni_gcm_enc_first_round (__m128i * r, __m128i * Y, u32 * ctr, __m128i k,
+ int n_blocks)
+{
+ u32 i;
+
+ if (PREDICT_TRUE ((u8) ctr[0] < (256 - n_blocks)))
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < n_blocks; i++)
+ {
+ Y[0] = _mm_add_epi32 (Y[0], last_byte_one);
+ r[i] = k ^ Y[0];
+ }
+ ctr[0] += n_blocks;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < n_blocks; i++)
+ {
+ Y[0] = _mm_insert_epi32 (Y[0], clib_host_to_net_u32 (++ctr[0]), 3);
+ r[i] = k ^ Y[0];
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static_always_inline void
+aesni_gcm_enc_round (__m128i * r, __m128i k, int n_blocks)
+{
+ for (int i = 0; i < n_blocks; i++)
+ r[i] = _mm_aesenc_si128 (r[i], k);
+}
+
+static_always_inline void
+aesni_gcm_enc_last_round (__m128i * r, __m128i * d, const __m128i * k,
+ int rounds, int n_blocks)
+{
+
+ /* additional ronuds for AES-192 and AES-256 */
+ for (int i = 10; i < rounds; i++)
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[i], n_blocks);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < n_blocks; i++)
+ d[i] ^= _mm_aesenclast_si128 (r[i], k[rounds]);
+}
+
+static_always_inline __m128i
+aesni_gcm_ghash_blocks (__m128i T, aes_gcm_key_data_t * kd,
+ const __m128i * in, int n_blocks)
+{
+ ghash_data_t _gd, *gd = &_gd;
+ const __m128i *Hi = kd->Hi + n_blocks - 1;
+ ghash_mul_first (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (_mm_loadu_si128 (in)) ^ T, Hi[0]);
+ for (int i = 1; i < n_blocks; i++)
+ ghash_mul_next (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (_mm_loadu_si128 (in + i)), Hi[-i]);
+ ghash_reduce (gd);
+ ghash_reduce2 (gd);
+ return ghash_final (gd);
+}
+
+static_always_inline __m128i
+aesni_gcm_ghash (__m128i T, aes_gcm_key_data_t * kd, const __m128i * in,
+ u32 n_left)
+{
+
+ while (n_left >= 128)
+ {
+ T = aesni_gcm_ghash_blocks (T, kd, in, 8);
+ n_left -= 128;
+ in += 8;
+ }
+
+ if (n_left >= 64)
+ {
+ T = aesni_gcm_ghash_blocks (T, kd, in, 4);
+ n_left -= 64;
+ in += 4;
+ }
+
+ if (n_left >= 32)
+ {
+ T = aesni_gcm_ghash_blocks (T, kd, in, 2);
+ n_left -= 32;
+ in += 2;
+ }
+
+ if (n_left >= 16)
+ {
+ T = aesni_gcm_ghash_blocks (T, kd, in, 1);
+ n_left -= 16;
+ in += 1;
+ }
+
+ if (n_left)
+ {
+ __m128i r = aesni_gcm_load_partial ((__m128i *) in, n_left);
+ T = ghash_mul (aesni_gcm_bswap (r) ^ T, kd->Hi[0]);
+ }
+ return T;
+}
+
+static_always_inline __m128i
+aesni_gcm_calc (__m128i T, aes_gcm_key_data_t * kd, __m128i * d,
+ __m128i * Y, u32 * ctr, __m128i * inv, __m128i * outv,
+ int rounds, int n, int last_block_bytes, int with_ghash,
+ int is_encrypt)
+{
+ __m128i r[n];
+ ghash_data_t _gd = { }, *gd = &_gd;
+ const __m128i *k = kd->Ke;
+ int hidx = is_encrypt ? 4 : n, didx = 0;
+
+ _mm_prefetch (inv + 4, _MM_HINT_T0);
+
+ /* AES rounds 0 and 1 */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_first_round (r, Y, ctr, k[0], n);
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[1], n);
+
+ /* load data - decrypt round */
+ if (is_encrypt == 0)
+ aesni_gcm_load (d, inv, n, last_block_bytes);
+
+ /* GHASH multiply block 1 */
+ if (with_ghash)
+ ghash_mul_first (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (d[didx++]) ^ T, kd->Hi[--hidx]);
+
+ /* AES rounds 2 and 3 */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[2], n);
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[3], n);
+
+ /* GHASH multiply block 2 */
+ if (with_ghash && hidx)
+ ghash_mul_next (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (d[didx++]), kd->Hi[--hidx]);
+
+ /* AES rounds 4 and 5 */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[4], n);
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[5], n);
+
+ /* GHASH multiply block 3 */
+ if (with_ghash && hidx)
+ ghash_mul_next (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (d[didx++]), kd->Hi[--hidx]);
+
+ /* AES rounds 6 and 7 */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[6], n);
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[7], n);
+
+ /* GHASH multiply block 4 */
+ if (with_ghash && hidx)
+ ghash_mul_next (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (d[didx++]), kd->Hi[--hidx]);
+
+ /* AES rounds 8 and 9 */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[8], n);
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[9], n);
+
+ /* GHASH reduce 1st step */
+ if (with_ghash)
+ ghash_reduce (gd);
+
+ /* load data - encrypt round */
+ if (is_encrypt)
+ aesni_gcm_load (d, inv, n, last_block_bytes);
+
+ /* GHASH reduce 2nd step */
+ if (with_ghash)
+ ghash_reduce2 (gd);
+
+ /* AES last round(s) */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_last_round (r, d, k, rounds, n);
+
+ /* store data */
+ aesni_gcm_store (d, outv, n, last_block_bytes);
+
+ /* GHASH final step */
+ if (with_ghash)
+ T = ghash_final (gd);
+
+ return T;
+}
+
+static_always_inline __m128i
+aesni_gcm_calc_double (__m128i T, aes_gcm_key_data_t * kd, __m128i * d,
+ __m128i * Y, u32 * ctr, __m128i * inv, __m128i * outv,
+ int rounds, int is_encrypt)
+{
+ __m128i r[4];
+ ghash_data_t _gd, *gd = &_gd;
+ const __m128i *k = kd->Ke;
+
+ /* AES rounds 0 and 1 */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_first_round (r, Y, ctr, k[0], 4);
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[1], 4);
+
+ /* load 4 blocks of data - decrypt round */
+ if (is_encrypt == 0)
+ aesni_gcm_load (d, inv, 4, 0);
+
+ /* GHASH multiply block 0 */
+ ghash_mul_first (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (d[0]) ^ T, kd->Hi[7]);
+
+ /* AES rounds 2 and 3 */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[2], 4);
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[3], 4);
+
+ /* GHASH multiply block 1 */
+ ghash_mul_next (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (d[1]), kd->Hi[6]);
+
+ /* AES rounds 4 and 5 */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[4], 4);
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[5], 4);
+
+ /* GHASH multiply block 2 */
+ ghash_mul_next (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (d[2]), kd->Hi[5]);
+
+ /* AES rounds 6 and 7 */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[6], 4);
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[7], 4);
+
+ /* GHASH multiply block 3 */
+ ghash_mul_next (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (d[3]), kd->Hi[4]);
+
+ /* AES rounds 8 and 9 */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[8], 4);
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[9], 4);
+
+ /* load 4 blocks of data - encrypt round */
+ if (is_encrypt)
+ aesni_gcm_load (d, inv, 4, 0);
+
+ /* AES last round(s) */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_last_round (r, d, k, rounds, 4);
+
+ /* store 4 blocks of data */
+ aesni_gcm_store (d, outv, 4, 0);
+
+ /* load next 4 blocks of data data - decrypt round */
+ if (is_encrypt == 0)
+ aesni_gcm_load (d, inv + 4, 4, 0);
+
+ /* GHASH multiply block 4 */
+ ghash_mul_next (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (d[0]), kd->Hi[3]);
+
+ /* AES rounds 0, 1 and 2 */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_first_round (r, Y, ctr, k[0], 4);
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[1], 4);
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[2], 4);
+
+ /* GHASH multiply block 5 */
+ ghash_mul_next (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (d[1]), kd->Hi[2]);
+
+ /* AES rounds 3 and 4 */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[3], 4);
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[4], 4);
+
+ /* GHASH multiply block 6 */
+ ghash_mul_next (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (d[2]), kd->Hi[1]);
+
+ /* AES rounds 5 and 6 */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[5], 4);
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[6], 4);
+
+ /* GHASH multiply block 7 */
+ ghash_mul_next (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (d[3]), kd->Hi[0]);
+
+ /* AES rounds 7 and 8 */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[7], 4);
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[8], 4);
+
+ /* GHASH reduce 1st step */
+ ghash_reduce (gd);
+
+ /* AES round 9 */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_round (r, k[9], 4);
+
+ /* load data - encrypt round */
+ if (is_encrypt)
+ aesni_gcm_load (d, inv + 4, 4, 0);
+
+ /* GHASH reduce 2nd step */
+ ghash_reduce2 (gd);
+
+ /* AES last round(s) */
+ aesni_gcm_enc_last_round (r, d, k, rounds, 4);
+
+ /* store data */
+ aesni_gcm_store (d, outv + 4, 4, 0);
+
+ /* GHASH final step */
+ return ghash_final (gd);
+}
+
+static_always_inline __m128i
+aesni_gcm_ghash_last (__m128i T, aes_gcm_key_data_t * kd, __m128i * d,
+ int n_blocks, int n_bytes)
+{
+ ghash_data_t _gd, *gd = &_gd;
+
+ if (n_bytes)
+ d[n_blocks - 1] = aesni_gcm_byte_mask (d[n_blocks - 1], n_bytes);
+
+ ghash_mul_first (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (d[0]) ^ T, kd->Hi[n_blocks - 1]);
+ if (n_blocks > 1)
+ ghash_mul_next (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (d[1]), kd->Hi[n_blocks - 2]);
+ if (n_blocks > 2)
+ ghash_mul_next (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (d[2]), kd->Hi[n_blocks - 3]);
+ if (n_blocks > 3)
+ ghash_mul_next (gd, aesni_gcm_bswap (d[3]), kd->Hi[n_blocks - 4]);
+ ghash_reduce (gd);
+ ghash_reduce2 (gd);
+ return ghash_final (gd);
+}
+
+
+static_always_inline __m128i
+aesni_gcm_enc (__m128i T, aes_gcm_key_data_t * kd, __m128i Y, const u8 * in,
+ const u8 * out, u32 n_left, int rounds)
+{
+ __m128i *inv = (__m128i *) in, *outv = (__m128i *) out;
+ __m128i d[4];
+ u32 ctr = 1;
+
+ if (n_left == 0)
+ return T;
+
+ if (n_left < 64)
+ {
+ if (n_left > 48)
+ {
+ n_left &= 0x0f;
+ aesni_gcm_calc (T, kd, d, &Y, &ctr, inv, outv, rounds, 4, n_left,
+ /* with_ghash */ 0, /* is_encrypt */ 1);
+ return aesni_gcm_ghash_last (T, kd, d, 4, n_left);
+ }
+ else if (n_left > 32)
+ {
+ n_left &= 0x0f;
+ aesni_gcm_calc (T, kd, d, &Y, &ctr, inv, outv, rounds, 3, n_left,
+ /* with_ghash */ 0, /* is_encrypt */ 1);
+ return aesni_gcm_ghash_last (T, kd, d, 3, n_left);
+ }
+ else if (n_left > 16)
+ {
+ n_left &= 0x0f;
+ aesni_gcm_calc (T, kd, d, &Y, &ctr, inv, outv, rounds, 2, n_left,
+ /* with_ghash */ 0, /* is_encrypt */ 1);
+ return aesni_gcm_ghash_last (T, kd, d, 2, n_left);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ n_left &= 0x0f;
+ aesni_gcm_calc (T, kd, d, &Y, &ctr, inv, outv, rounds, 1, n_left,
+ /* with_ghash */ 0, /* is_encrypt */ 1);
+ return aesni_gcm_ghash_last (T, kd, d, 1, n_left);
+ }
+ }
+
+ aesni_gcm_calc (T, kd, d, &Y, &ctr, inv, outv, rounds, 4, 0,
+ /* with_ghash */ 0, /* is_encrypt */ 1);
+
+ /* next */
+ n_left -= 64;
+ outv += 4;
+ inv += 4;
+
+ while (n_left >= 128)
+ {
+ T = aesni_gcm_calc_double (T, kd, d, &Y, &ctr, inv, outv, rounds,
+ /* is_encrypt */ 1);
+
+ /* next */
+ n_left -= 128;
+ outv += 8;
+ inv += 8;
+ }
+
+ if (n_left >= 64)
+ {
+ T = aesni_gcm_calc (T, kd, d, &Y, &ctr, inv, outv, rounds, 4, 0,
+ /* with_ghash */ 1, /* is_encrypt */ 1);
+
+ /* next */
+ n_left -= 64;
+ outv += 4;
+ inv += 4;
+ }
+
+ if (n_left == 0)
+ return aesni_gcm_ghash_last (T, kd, d, 4, 0);
+
+ if (n_left > 48)
+ {
+ n_left &= 0x0f;
+ T = aesni_gcm_calc (T, kd, d, &Y, &ctr, inv, outv, rounds, 4, n_left,
+ /* with_ghash */ 1, /* is_encrypt */ 1);
+ return aesni_gcm_ghash_last (T, kd, d, 4, n_left);
+ }
+
+ if (n_left > 32)
+ {
+ n_left &= 0x0f;
+ T = aesni_gcm_calc (T, kd, d, &Y, &ctr, inv, outv, rounds, 3, n_left,
+ /* with_ghash */ 1, /* is_encrypt */ 1);
+ return aesni_gcm_ghash_last (T, kd, d, 3, n_left);
+ }
+
+ if (n_left > 16)
+ {
+ n_left &= 0x0f;
+ T = aesni_gcm_calc (T, kd, d, &Y, &ctr, inv, outv, rounds, 2, n_left,
+ /* with_ghash */ 1, /* is_encrypt */ 1);
+ return aesni_gcm_ghash_last (T, kd, d, 2, n_left);
+ }
+
+ n_left &= 0x0f;
+ T = aesni_gcm_calc (T, kd, d, &Y, &ctr, inv, outv, rounds, 1, n_left,
+ /* with_ghash */ 1, /* is_encrypt */ 1);
+ return aesni_gcm_ghash_last (T, kd, d, 1, n_left);
+}
+
+static_always_inline __m128i
+aesni_gcm_dec (__m128i T, aes_gcm_key_data_t * kd, __m128i Y, const u8 * in,
+ const u8 * out, u32 n_left, int rounds)
+{
+ __m128i *inv = (__m128i *) in, *outv = (__m128i *) out;
+ __m128i d[8];
+ u32 ctr = 1;
+
+ while (n_left >= 128)
+ {
+ T = aesni_gcm_calc_double (T, kd, d, &Y, &ctr, inv, outv, rounds,
+ /* is_encrypt */ 0);
+
+ /* next */
+ n_left -= 128;
+ outv += 8;
+ inv += 8;
+ }
+
+ if (n_left >= 64)
+ {
+ T = aesni_gcm_calc (T, kd, d, &Y, &ctr, inv, outv, rounds, 4, 0, 1, 0);
+
+ /* next */
+ n_left -= 64;
+ outv += 4;
+ inv += 4;
+ }
+
+ if (n_left == 0)
+ return T;
+
+ if (n_left > 48)
+ return aesni_gcm_calc (T, kd, d, &Y, &ctr, inv, outv, rounds, 4,
+ n_left - 48,
+ /* with_ghash */ 1, /* is_encrypt */ 0);
+
+ if (n_left > 32)
+ return aesni_gcm_calc (T, kd, d, &Y, &ctr, inv, outv, rounds, 3,
+ n_left - 32,
+ /* with_ghash */ 1, /* is_encrypt */ 0);
+
+ if (n_left > 16)
+ return aesni_gcm_calc (T, kd, d, &Y, &ctr, inv, outv, rounds, 2,
+ n_left - 16,
+ /* with_ghash */ 1, /* is_encrypt */ 0);
+
+ return aesni_gcm_calc (T, kd, d, &Y, &ctr, inv, outv, rounds, 1, n_left,
+ /* with_ghash */ 1, /* is_encrypt */ 0);
+}
+
+static_always_inline int
+aes_gcm (const u8 * in, u8 * out, const u8 * addt, const u8 * iv, u8 * tag,
+ u32 data_bytes, u32 aad_bytes, u8 tag_len, aes_gcm_key_data_t * kd,
+ int aes_rounds, int is_encrypt)
+{
+ int i;
+ __m128i r, Y0, T = { };
+ ghash_data_t _gd, *gd = &_gd;
+
+ _mm_prefetch (iv, _MM_HINT_T0);
+ _mm_prefetch (in, _MM_HINT_T0);
+ _mm_prefetch (in + CLIB_CACHE_LINE_BYTES, _MM_HINT_T0);
+
+ /* calculate ghash for AAD - optimized for ipsec common cases */
+ if (aad_bytes == 8)
+ T = aesni_gcm_ghash (T, kd, (__m128i *) addt, 8);
+ else if (aad_bytes == 12)
+ T = aesni_gcm_ghash (T, kd, (__m128i *) addt, 12);
+ else
+ T = aesni_gcm_ghash (T, kd, (__m128i *) addt, aad_bytes);
+
+ /* initalize counter */
+ Y0 = _mm_loadu_si128 ((__m128i *) iv);
+ Y0 = _mm_insert_epi32 (Y0, clib_host_to_net_u32 (1), 3);
+
+ /* ghash and encrypt/edcrypt */
+ if (is_encrypt)
+ T = aesni_gcm_enc (T, kd, Y0, in, out, data_bytes, aes_rounds);
+ else
+ T = aesni_gcm_dec (T, kd, Y0, in, out, data_bytes, aes_rounds);
+
+ _mm_prefetch (tag, _MM_HINT_T0);
+
+ /* Finalize ghash */
+ r[0] = data_bytes;
+ r[1] = aad_bytes;
+
+ /* bytes to bits */
+ r <<= 3;
+
+ /* interleaved computation of final ghash and E(Y0, k) */
+ ghash_mul_first (gd, r ^ T, kd->Hi[0]);
+ r = kd->Ke[0] ^ Y0;
+ for (i = 1; i < 5; i += 1)
+ r = _mm_aesenc_si128 (r, kd->Ke[i]);
+ ghash_reduce (gd);
+ ghash_reduce2 (gd);
+ for (; i < 9; i += 1)
+ r = _mm_aesenc_si128 (r, kd->Ke[i]);
+ T = ghash_final (gd);
+ for (; i < aes_rounds; i += 1)
+ r = _mm_aesenc_si128 (r, kd->Ke[i]);
+ r = _mm_aesenclast_si128 (r, kd->Ke[aes_rounds]);
+ T = aesni_gcm_bswap (T) ^ r;
+
+ /* tag_len 16 -> 0 */
+ tag_len &= 0xf;
+
+ if (is_encrypt)
+ {
+ /* store tag */
+ if (tag_len)
+ aesni_gcm_store_partial ((__m128i *) tag, T, (1 << tag_len) - 1);
+ else
+ _mm_storeu_si128 ((__m128i *) tag, T);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* check tag */
+ u16 tag_mask = tag_len ? (1 << tag_len) - 1 : 0xffff;
+ r = _mm_loadu_si128 ((__m128i *) tag);
+ if (_mm_movemask_epi8 (r == T) != tag_mask)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static_always_inline u32
+aesni_ops_enc_aes_gcm (vlib_main_t * vm, vnet_crypto_op_t * ops[],
+ u32 n_ops, aesni_key_size_t ks)
+{
+ crypto_ia32_main_t *cm = &crypto_ia32_main;
+ vnet_crypto_op_t *op = ops[0];
+ aes_gcm_key_data_t *kd;
+ u32 n_left = n_ops;
+
+
+next:
+ kd = (aes_gcm_key_data_t *) cm->key_data[op->key_index];
+ aes_gcm (op->src, op->dst, op->aad, op->iv, op->tag, op->len, op->aad_len,
+ op->tag_len, kd, AESNI_KEY_ROUNDS (ks), /* is_encrypt */ 1);
+ op->status = VNET_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_COMPLETED;
+
+ if (--n_left)
+ {
+ op += 1;
+ goto next;
+ }
+
+ return n_ops;
+}
+
+static_always_inline u32
+aesni_ops_dec_aes_gcm (vlib_main_t * vm, vnet_crypto_op_t * ops[],
+ u32 n_ops, aesni_key_size_t ks)
+{
+ crypto_ia32_main_t *cm = &crypto_ia32_main;
+ vnet_crypto_op_t *op = ops[0];
+ aes_gcm_key_data_t *kd;
+ u32 n_left = n_ops;
+ int rv;
+
+next:
+ kd = (aes_gcm_key_data_t *) cm->key_data[op->key_index];
+ rv = aes_gcm (op->src, op->dst, op->aad, op->iv, op->tag, op->len,
+ op->aad_len, op->tag_len, kd, AESNI_KEY_ROUNDS (ks),
+ /* is_encrypt */ 0);
+
+ if (rv)
+ {
+ op->status = VNET_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_COMPLETED;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ op->status = VNET_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_FAIL_BAD_HMAC;
+ n_ops--;
+ }
+
+ if (--n_left)
+ {
+ op += 1;
+ goto next;
+ }
+
+ return n_ops;
+}
+
+static_always_inline void *
+aesni_gcm_key_exp (vnet_crypto_key_t * key, aesni_key_size_t ks)
+{
+ aes_gcm_key_data_t *kd;
+ __m128i H;
+ int i;
+
+ kd = clib_mem_alloc_aligned (sizeof (*kd), CLIB_CACHE_LINE_BYTES);
+
+ /* expand AES key */
+ aes_key_expand ((__m128i *) kd->Ke, key->data, ks);
+
+ /* pre-calculate H */
+ H = kd->Ke[0];
+ for (i = 1; i < AESNI_KEY_ROUNDS (ks); i += 1)
+ H = _mm_aesenc_si128 (H, kd->Ke[i]);
+ H = _mm_aesenclast_si128 (H, kd->Ke[i]);
+ H = aesni_gcm_bswap (H);
+ ghash_precompute (H, (__m128i *) kd->Hi, 8);
+ return kd;
+}
+
+#define foreach_aesni_gcm_handler_type _(128) _(192) _(256)
+
+#define _(x) \
+static u32 aesni_ops_dec_aes_gcm_##x \
+(vlib_main_t * vm, vnet_crypto_op_t * ops[], u32 n_ops) \
+{ return aesni_ops_dec_aes_gcm (vm, ops, n_ops, AESNI_KEY_##x); } \
+static u32 aesni_ops_enc_aes_gcm_##x \
+(vlib_main_t * vm, vnet_crypto_op_t * ops[], u32 n_ops) \
+{ return aesni_ops_enc_aes_gcm (vm, ops, n_ops, AESNI_KEY_##x); } \
+static void * aesni_gcm_key_exp_##x (vnet_crypto_key_t *key) \
+{ return aesni_gcm_key_exp (key, AESNI_KEY_##x); }
+
+foreach_aesni_gcm_handler_type;
+#undef _
+
+clib_error_t *
+#ifdef __AVX512F__
+crypto_ia32_aesni_gcm_init_avx512 (vlib_main_t * vm)
+#elif __AVX2__
+crypto_ia32_aesni_gcm_init_avx2 (vlib_main_t * vm)
+#else
+crypto_ia32_aesni_gcm_init_sse42 (vlib_main_t * vm)
+#endif
+{
+ crypto_ia32_main_t *cm = &crypto_ia32_main;
+
+#define _(x) \
+ vnet_crypto_register_ops_handler (vm, cm->crypto_engine_index, \
+ VNET_CRYPTO_OP_AES_##x##_GCM_ENC, \
+ aesni_ops_enc_aes_gcm_##x); \
+ vnet_crypto_register_ops_handler (vm, cm->crypto_engine_index, \
+ VNET_CRYPTO_OP_AES_##x##_GCM_DEC, \
+ aesni_ops_dec_aes_gcm_##x); \
+ cm->key_fn[VNET_CRYPTO_ALG_AES_##x##_GCM] = aesni_gcm_key_exp_##x;
+ foreach_aesni_gcm_handler_type;
+#undef _
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * fd.io coding-style-patch-verification: ON
+ *
+ * Local Variables:
+ * eval: (c-set-style "gnu")
+ * End:
+ */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ *------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates.
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at:
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ *------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+/*
+ *------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Copyright(c) 2018, Intel Corporation All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ * * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its
+ * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ * from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+ * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES * LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Based on work by: Shay Gueron, Michael E. Kounavis, Erdinc Ozturk,
+ * Vinodh Gopal, James Guilford, Tomasz Kantecki
+ *
+ * References:
+ * [1] Vinodh Gopal et. al. Optimized Galois-Counter-Mode Implementation on
+ * Intel Architecture Processors. August, 2010
+ * [2] Erdinc Ozturk et. al. Enabling High-Performance Galois-Counter-Mode on
+ * Intel Architecture Processors. October, 2012.
+ * [3] intel-ipsec-mb library, https://github.com/01org/intel-ipsec-mb.git
+ *
+ * Definitions:
+ * GF Galois Extension Field GF(2^128) - finite field where elements are
+ * represented as polynomials with coefficients in GF(2) with the
+ * highest degree of 127. Polynomials are represented as 128-bit binary
+ * numbers where each bit represents one coefficient.
+ * e.g. polynomial x^5 + x^3 + x + 1 is represented in binary 101011.
+ * H hash key (128 bit)
+ * POLY irreducible polynomial x^127 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1
+ * RPOLY irreducible polynomial x^128 + x^127 + x^126 + x^121 + 1
+ * + addition in GF, which equals to XOR operation
+ * * multiplication in GF
+ *
+ * GF multiplication consists of 2 steps:
+ * - carry-less multiplication of two 128-bit operands into 256-bit result
+ * - reduction of 256-bit result into 128-bit with modulo POLY
+ *
+ * GHash is calculated on 128-bit blocks of data according to the following
+ * formula:
+ * GH = (GH + data) * hash_key
+ *
+ * To avoid bit-reflection of data, this code uses GF multipication
+ * with reversed polynomial:
+ * a * b * x^-127 mod RPOLY
+ *
+ * To improve computation speed table Hi is precomputed with powers of H',
+ * where H' is calculated as H<<1 mod RPOLY.
+ * This allows us to improve performance by deferring reduction. For example
+ * to caclulate ghash of 4 128-bit blocks of data (b0, b1, b2, b3), we can do:
+ *
+ * __i128 Hi[4];
+ * ghash_precompute (H, Hi, 4);
+ *
+ * ghash_data_t _gd, *gd = &_gd;
+ * ghash_mul_first (gd, GH ^ b0, Hi[3]);
+ * ghash_mul_next (gd, b1, Hi[2]);
+ * ghash_mul_next (gd, b2, Hi[1]);
+ * ghash_mul_next (gd, b3, Hi[0]);
+ * ghash_reduce (gd);
+ * ghash_reduce2 (gd);
+ * GH = ghash_final (gd);
+ *
+ * Reduction step is split into 3 functions so it can be better interleaved
+ * with other code, (i.e. with AES computation).
+ */
+
+#ifndef __ghash_h__
+#define __ghash_h__
+
+/* on AVX-512 systems we can save a clock cycle by using ternary logic
+ instruction to calculate a XOR b XOR c */
+static_always_inline __m128i
+ghash_xor3 (__m128i a, __m128i b, __m128i c)
+{
+#if defined (__AVX512F__)
+ return _mm_ternarylogic_epi32 (a, b, c, 0x96);
+#endif
+ return a ^ b ^ c;
+}
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ __m128i mid, hi, lo, tmp_lo, tmp_hi;
+ int pending;
+} ghash_data_t;
+
+static const __m128i ghash_poly = { 1, 0xC200000000000000 };
+static const __m128i ghash_poly2 = { 0x1C2000000, 0xC200000000000000 };
+
+static_always_inline void
+ghash_mul_first (ghash_data_t * gd, __m128i a, __m128i b)
+{
+ /* a1 * b1 */
+ gd->hi = _mm_clmulepi64_si128 (a, b, 0x11);
+ /* a0 * b0 */
+ gd->lo = _mm_clmulepi64_si128 (a, b, 0x00);
+ /* a0 * b1 ^ a1 * b0 */
+ gd->mid = (_mm_clmulepi64_si128 (a, b, 0x01) ^
+ _mm_clmulepi64_si128 (a, b, 0x10));
+
+ /* set gd->pending to 0 so next invocation of ghash_mul_next(...) knows that
+ there is no pending data in tmp_lo and tmp_hi */
+ gd->pending = 0;
+}
+
+static_always_inline void
+ghash_mul_next (ghash_data_t * gd, __m128i a, __m128i b)
+{
+ /* a1 * b1 */
+ __m128i hi = _mm_clmulepi64_si128 (a, b, 0x11);
+ /* a0 * b0 */
+ __m128i lo = _mm_clmulepi64_si128 (a, b, 0x00);
+
+ /* this branch will be optimized out by the compiler, and it allows us to
+ reduce number of XOR operations by using ternary logic */
+ if (gd->pending)
+ {
+ /* there is peding data from previous invocation so we can XOR */
+ gd->hi = ghash_xor3 (gd->hi, gd->tmp_hi, hi);
+ gd->lo = ghash_xor3 (gd->lo, gd->tmp_lo, lo);
+ gd->pending = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* there is no peding data from previous invocation so we postpone XOR */
+ gd->tmp_hi = hi;
+ gd->tmp_lo = lo;
+ gd->pending = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* gd->mid ^= a0 * b1 ^ a1 * b0 */
+ gd->mid = ghash_xor3 (gd->mid,
+ _mm_clmulepi64_si128 (a, b, 0x01),
+ _mm_clmulepi64_si128 (a, b, 0x10));
+}
+
+static_always_inline void
+ghash_reduce (ghash_data_t * gd)
+{
+ __m128i r;
+
+ /* Final combination:
+ gd->lo ^= gd->mid << 64
+ gd->hi ^= gd->mid >> 64 */
+ __m128i midl = _mm_slli_si128 (gd->mid, 8);
+ __m128i midr = _mm_srli_si128 (gd->mid, 8);
+
+ if (gd->pending)
+ {
+ gd->lo = ghash_xor3 (gd->lo, gd->tmp_lo, midl);
+ gd->hi = ghash_xor3 (gd->hi, gd->tmp_hi, midr);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ gd->lo ^= midl;
+ gd->hi ^= midr;
+ }
+
+ r = _mm_clmulepi64_si128 (ghash_poly2, gd->lo, 0x01);
+ gd->lo ^= _mm_slli_si128 (r, 8);
+}
+
+static_always_inline void
+ghash_reduce2 (ghash_data_t * gd)
+{
+ gd->tmp_lo = _mm_clmulepi64_si128 (ghash_poly2, gd->lo, 0x00);
+ gd->tmp_hi = _mm_clmulepi64_si128 (ghash_poly2, gd->lo, 0x10);
+}
+
+static_always_inline __m128i
+ghash_final (ghash_data_t * gd)
+{
+ return ghash_xor3 (gd->hi, _mm_srli_si128 (gd->tmp_lo, 4),
+ _mm_slli_si128 (gd->tmp_hi, 4));
+}
+
+static_always_inline __m128i
+ghash_mul (__m128i a, __m128i b)
+{
+ ghash_data_t _gd, *gd = &_gd;
+ ghash_mul_first (gd, a, b);
+ ghash_reduce (gd);
+ ghash_reduce2 (gd);
+ return ghash_final (gd);
+}
+
+static_always_inline void
+ghash_precompute (__m128i H, __m128i * Hi, int count)
+{
+ __m128i r;
+ /* calcullate H<<1 mod poly from the hash key */
+ r = _mm_srli_epi64 (H, 63);
+ H = _mm_slli_epi64 (H, 1);
+ H |= _mm_slli_si128 (r, 8);
+ r = _mm_srli_si128 (r, 8);
+ r = _mm_shuffle_epi32 (r, 0x24);
+ /* *INDENT-OFF* */
+ r = _mm_cmpeq_epi32 (r, (__m128i) (u32x4) {1, 0, 0, 1});
+ /* *INDENT-ON* */
+ Hi[0] = H ^ (r & ghash_poly);
+
+ /* calculate H^(i + 1) */
+ for (int i = 1; i < count; i++)
+ Hi[i] = ghash_mul (Hi[0], Hi[i - 1]);
+}
+
+#endif /* __ghash_h__ */
+
+/*
+ * fd.io coding-style-patch-verification: ON
+ *
+ * Local Variables:
+ * eval: (c-set-style "gnu")
+ * End:
+ */
Code Review / vpp.git / commitdiff